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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the relationship between supranational integration and
domestic party-system polarization (extremism). We first construct a theoretical
argument that uncovers the key trade-off between the “output legitimacy” of a
supranationally integrated party system and the inevitable loss of “input legitimacy”
caused by externally imposed policy constraints. This translates into a strategic
tradeoff between responsibility and responsiveness at the party level of electoral com-
petition. We hypothesize that while moderate supranational policy constraints can
initially speed-up platform convergence, ever-closer political integration may reverse
the trend towards higher levels of party-system polarization and party extremism. We
apply our framework to the case of EU integration and test our key non-monotonic
prediction both at the party-system level of polarization and at the party level of
ideological extremism. Finally, we apply to synthetic control method (SCM) for
causal inference in comparative case studies to study how political integration and
supranational policy constraints have affected their overall level of party-system
polarization over time. Our overall empirical analysis strongly corroborates our
theoretical argument.
Keywords Party-system polarization · Extremism · Output legitimacy ·
Input legitimacy · European integration · Economic globalization ·
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1 Introduction
Advanced liberal democracies have entered a period of political turbulence where
the processes of economic globalization and supranational integration are affecting
the core of domestic government and politics by creating deep fissures in cabi-
nets, parties, and society at large. Evidence abounds of trends such as party-system
dealignment and weakening of partisanship throughout the latest era of globalization
(Przeworski 2019). “Brexit” in the UK, Trump’s victory in the US, and the contem-
poraneous rise of right-wing nativist populism in the European “North” and left-wing
redistributionist populism in the European “South” can all be viewed through the
same prism of a populist backlash against the “straitjacket” of economic globaliza-
tion and political integration (Algan et al. 2017; Autor et al. 2017; Colantone and
Stanig 2018; Guiso et al. 2017; Rodrik 2017). Effectively, the common thread that
connects all these electoral results is that of increasing party-system polarization and
party extremism stemming from the increasing “sovereignty costs” of supranational
integration and economic interdependence (Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019).
Political scientists have shifted their attention to the study of political polarization
because, even if policy outcomes remain the same, higher polarization implies height-
ened political uncertainty for citizens – albeit together with better defined political
platform choices – as well as increased political country risk for foreign investors
(Beazer and Blake 2018). With polarization, legislative politics become increasingly
adversarial, (coalition) governments more unstable, and policy outputs potentially
more volatile. What is more, domestic political instability may trigger a backlash
against international unions and organizations – such as the European Union (EU)
– as increased polarization along the pro/anti- integration axis may generate nega-
tive political spillovers for supranational governance: policy deadlock, the rise in the
political implementation costs of policy reforms, the undermining of public support
(Bearce and Jolliff Scott 2019), or even the political unraveling of the integration
process itself (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Obermeier 2018).
Political polarization may manifest itself at various stages of the domestic politi-
cal process: in elections (Cox 1990), the government formation process (Indridason
2011), legislative bargaining (McCarty et al. 2006), and political communication
(Prior 2013).1 In the context of US politics, political polarization is tantamount to
the ideological differentiation between the two main congressional parties (Layman
et al. 2006). However, when it comes to parliamentary multi-party systems, the con-
cept of polarization is not as straightforward in terms of measurement as it needs to
account for both ideological differentiation (also in the form of political extremism)
and party fragmentation, whereby niche groups of extremist ideologues may splinter
off from larger office-seeking parties (Ezrow 2010).2 In both contexts, much of the
1Thus, the concept lends itself to different levels of measurement: at the voter level (using public opinion
data), at the party level (using party manifesto data), at the electoral level (using vote share data), or at the
legislative representation level (using seat allocation data).
2The aggregate measurement of polarization in multi-party systems need also consider that convergence
may take place among centrist parties and divergence between smaller extremist parties and centrist ones.
This might explain the shortcomings of existing measures of polarization in multi-party systems (see, e.g.,
Dalton 2008; Esteban and Ray 1994; Stanig 2011).
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existing literature has studied the effects of constitutional rules and institutions, such
as the (dis)proportionality of the electoral system (Calvo and Hellwig 2011; Curini
and Hino 2012; Dow 2011; Ezrow 2008; Iaryczower and Mattozzi 2013; Matakos
et al. 2016), gerrymandering (McCarty et al. 2009), and primary elections (Hirano
et al. 2013), on party-system compactness, polarization, and extremism.
We focus instead on how extraneous policy rules and constraints – stemming
from a country’s level of political integration within regional blocs in addition to its
economic integration within global markets3 – affect party-system polarization and
party-level platform divergence within the context of electoral competition. To illus-
trate our argument, we choose to focus on the EU as a preeminent example of a
regional experiment in supranational integration that has given rise to a thick web
of policy rules and regulations effectively constraining policy-making at the national
level (sovereignty costs). In theorizing about this relationship, we highlight the trade-
off between the “inputs” of democratic representation and the “outputs” of material
compensation (Frieden 2019) as the key determinant of the effects of supranational
integration on domestic party systems.4 More specifically, we show that a polar-
ization backlash may ensue at the point where the “output legitimacy” of an open
and supranationally bound domestic political system is not sufficient to counterbal-
ance the inevitable loss of democratic responsiveness caused by externally imposed
constraints on its domestic sources of “input legitimacy”.
In our theoretical section, we provide an informal argument that first expounds
this implicit trade-off between input and output legitimacy (or else representation
vs. compensation) at the party-system level and then projects this trade-off onto the
mixed incentives of parties strategically choosing a convergent or divergent policy
platform in order to achieve the optimal balance between maximizing their chances
of electoral success and minimizing their (ideological) “transportation costs”. More
specifically, we build on Schneider’s (2019) findings with regard to the two dis-
tinct objects of electoral accountability in EU party systems: diffuse support for the
project of European integration – which is arguably higher (lower) during times of
growth and prosperity (recession and secular stagnation) – and spatial preferences for
specific policies.5
In particular, parties on the two sides of the ideological spectrum face the follow-
ing trade-off: they can either tap into diffuse support for European integration by
proposing platforms in line with the EU’s policy constraints at the risk, however, of
alienating their core ideological base (high transportation costs), or they can choose
3In fact, Autor et al. (2017) find increasing support for nativist or extreme politicians in congressional US
districts exposed to larger increases in import penetration.
4Although we do account for the potential spillover effects of domestic-level polarization on supranational
political processes in our empirics, our theoretical argument amounts to a partial equilibrium analysis that
takes the process of integration deepening as exogenous and assumes that there is always a majority of
voters in favor of integration so that in effect adherence to the imported policy constraints is never really
in question.
5Note that here we assume that diffuse support for the EU per se is uniform across the electorate. We
effectively distinguish between pro-EU, Euroskeptic, and Europhobic voters with regard to their individual
ideological preferences and whether those are compatible with the EU’s policy agenda. In other words,
diffuse support for the EU acts as an orthogonal valence factor on voter preferences.
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to “stick to their guns” and propose Euroskeptic policy platforms in contravention of
the EU’s rules and regulations, thereby minimizing ideological transportation costs
but also foregoing the electoral valence benefits of diffuse support for the EU. There-
fore, we expect that, for low and moderate levels of supranational integration, i.e.,
slacker constraints on the domestic policy space and hence lower transportation costs,
extreme parties will find it profitable to moderately converge and propose platforms
that are tangentially congruent with EU policy rules and directives. However, as
supranational integration intensifies and, hence, the permissible policy space shrinks,
the rise in transportation costs will eventually trump the valence benefits of congru-
ence with the European acquis. If that is the case, extreme parties will become better
off pandering to their core supporters by proposing a Euroskeptic (non-congruent)
platform that minimizes the distance away from their core ideology. As a result,
our theoretical analysis generates the key prediction of a non-monotonic effect on
aggregate polarization at the domestic level: the gradual deepening of supranational
integration will at first lead to increasing platform convergence but, if it goes too far
in terms of truncating the permissible domestic policy space, it can also generate a
strong populist backlash in the form of extreme party-system polarization and fervent
anti-globalism.
To corroborate our theoretical argument, we use time-series cross-section data to
examine the effect of a country’s legal status vis-a`-vis the EU (formerly the European
Community) – i.e., whether it is an associate member, a candidate member, or a full
member – on its domestic party system. We control for the major treaties and time
periods of European integration to account for the effect of deepening commitments,
rules, and regulations as part of a shifting acquis. In accordance with our two-level
theoretical argument, we conduct different empirical tests using two distinct panels:
a first one at the party-system (country) level and a second one at the party level.
Both of our empirical analyses highlight the non-monotonic effect of integration on
party-system polarization and party-level extremism. In fact, the party systems in
our sample tend to experience this “breaking point ” before the Global Financial
Crisis and the EU’s “multiple crises” (i.e., debt, migration, populism, Brexit). In a
similar vein as Frieden (2019), we show that the current state of affairs is simply
the culmination of pre-crisis trends, while the recent crises simply exacerbate them
further.
Moreover, by way of correcting for the potential endogeneity of integration deci-
sions and post-treatment bias effects,6 we perform robustness tests using the synthetic
control method (SCM) (see Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al. 2010; and
Abadie et al. 2015) that relies on non-EUmember-states as counterfactual cases. This
quasi-experimental comparative case study method also allows us to illustrate the
explanatory power of our argument vis-a`-vis alternative explanations for long-term
trends in party-system polarization. All in all, we identify the behavior of parties and
6Note that in our theoretical analysis we do not seek to explain why countries integrate further per se.
We surmise that higher levels of economic and political integration come about as a result of pro-active
policies of market liberalization, openness to trade, and the extraneous pressures of globalization (e.g.,
capital flows, immigration flows, environmental externalities, etc.).
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the characteristics of party systems as intervening variables that capture the underly-
ing relationship between the input and output legitimacy of national democracies in
a interdependent political and economic environment.
With this paper, we also seek to contribute to the literature on the convergence
of national party systems and the transformation of electoral competition as a con-
sequence of regional integration (Dorussen and Nanou 2006; Hix 2003; Hobolt and
Tilley 2016; Mair 2000). Nanou and Dorussen (2013), for example, find that, because
EU legislation limits the set of policies that parties can pursue once in government,
the distance between parties’ positions has tended to decrease in policy domains
where EU involvement has increased. We actually expand on their results by taking
a systemic view of party-system polarization – thus obviating the need for an arbi-
trary distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream parties – and by deriving
the conditions for both conditional convergence and divergence of party platforms. In
this regard, the paper also contributes to the vast literature on spatial (voting) models
of party competition, which tends to focus on the electoral consequences and long-
term impact of parties’ ideological shifts (see, e.g., Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009;
Ezrow 2005, 2008; Hellwig 2012; Karreth et al. 2013; Williams 2015), but does not
always address the question of why they move to the center or to the margins.
In what follows, we first provide a theoretical discussion of the trade-off faced
by advanced liberal democracies between input and output legitimacy in the face of
political (and economic) integration. We then delve into that trade-off at the party
level by elaborating on the theoretical mechanism of ideological transportation costs
and showing that binding policy constraints will induce platform convergence up to
the point where internal pressures for representation and input legitimization by par-
tisan militants and core voters will cause divergence back towards the party’s intrinsic
ideology. Subsequently, we apply our argument to the EU context, test the theorized
effects of European integration on European parties and party systems using differ-
ent measures of party-system polarization and party-level extremism, and present
strong evidence confirming our hypothesized non-monotonic relationship between
supranational integration and party-system polarization. Finally, we conduct some
robustness tests using the synthetic control method and proceed to discuss some
comparative case studies. Alternative robustness tests are presented in the Online
Appendix available on the Review of International Organizations’ website.
2 The input and output legitimacy of party systems
In the current era, politics is no longer “business as usual” and that applies not just
to the supply side of electoral competition and policy formation but also the demand
side of partisanship and electoral behavior (Guiso et al. 2017). Recent electoral con-
tests in Western Europe, Latin America, and the US showcase the “political limits
of globalization” (Acemoglu and Yared 2010; Rodrik 2012) and the fragility of the
modern liberal world order. Arguably, the key factor that has introduced “noise” and
unexplained volatility into the post-war paradigm of output legitimacy and “embed-
ded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982) has been the corrosive effect of globalization on
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democratic politics in the form of heightened sovereignty costs (Copelovitch and
Pevehouse 2019).
Output legitimacy effectively pertains to the notion that a democratically elected
government should “care for the common good” by pursuing economic efficiency
and material prosperity. As such, it can potentially come at the expense of so-called
input legitimacy, which amounts to a government’s need to “carry out the will of the
people” through representative democratic processes and institutions (Scharpf 1999).
The two may be at odds when a government decides to pursue a policy that in its
own assessment would produce the best functional outcome for society as a whole
– even if the electorate would opt for a different policy direction –, resulting in a
tension between efficiency and democratic representation (Eichengreen and Leblang
2008).7 Policy responses to the recent Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Debt
Crisis accentuated the growing incongruence between the democratic functions of
“representative” government “by the people” and those of “responsible” government
“for the people” (Mair 2009). Executive dominance now seems to characterize the
predominant current of politics in advanced democracies as incumbents have come
to prioritize the pursuit of economic outputs over political inputs (Scharpf 2011). In
contemporary democracies, responsible (or output-oriented) government has taken
prevalence over representative (or input-oriented) government, thus fueling the rise of
populist parties that claim to still represent the “will of the people” but rarely deliver,
as opposed to mainstream parties that take responsibility but no longer seem to voice
their voters’ concerns (Caramani 2017).
The output legitimacy of the post-WWII liberal economic order emanated from
a long period of prosperity and economic growth as well as the establishment of
efficient compensation mechanisms of social welfare for those left behind (Burgoon
2001; Walter 2010). National politicians were able to steadily craft a well-entrenched
consensus over the desirable levels of integration within supranational governance
structures and openness to global markets whilst at the same time allowing enough
room for traditional left-right political vacillation within moderate levels of polar-
ization. As countries started to integrate further both politically and economically,
the menu of feasible and credible policy platforms became increasingly constrained
by the exigencies of economic openness and supranational integration (sovereignty
costs), thereby limiting the sources of input legitimacy and democratic representa-
tion. In other words, the pursuit of efficiency by means of economic integration, open
borders, and rule harmonization started to trump popular demands for democratic
institutions of regulation, stabilization, and social protection (part of the traditional
agenda of the socialist left) and undermine ethnic homogeneity and national self-
determination (part of the traditional agenda of the nationalist right). The rise in
capital mobility and the concurrent emergence of a certain market-enforced discipline
and orthodoxy in macroeconomic policy in the form of the “Washington Consen-
sus” and the “Golden Straitjacket” began to crystallize the informal (soft) constraints
7This trade-off was particularly evident in the recent British referendum debate between the Brexiteers’
insistence on democratic sovereignty outside of the EU and the Remainers’ emphasis on the sustained
prosperity and economic stability afforded by EU membership.
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of economic interdependence on the mainstream policy spectrum (Mosley 2005).
In addition, by joining (or aligning with) international organizations and unions
like the EU, the European Monetary Union (EMU), and the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), countries committed to formal (hard) policy constraints that truncated
their domestic policy space (sovereignty costs), limited what parties could credibly
promise in elections and deliver in government and, thus, curtailed their “room to
maneuver” (Hellwig 2016; Kosmidis 2018).
For as long as domestic political systems remained embedded within a broader
liberal democratic consensus the enhanced output legitimacy of liberal democratic
politics induced parties to keep converging towards a set of policy inputs as cir-
cumscribed by the extraneous policy constraints of political feasibility, economic
orthodoxy, and formal international commitments – albeit at the expense of unfet-
tered democratic responsiveness. Eventually, however, this failure of representation
came to be compounded by a failure of compensation for a large part of the popu-
lation, a trend that was further exacerbated by the devastating effects of the Global
Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Debt Crisis on the economy and the welfare state
(Frieden 2019). There came a point in a number of advanced industrial democra-
cies where populist leaders (of both the redistributionist left-wing and the nativist
right-wing types) inveighing against the globalism of liberal elites and supranational
bureaucrats started to gain in popularity and a populist anti-globalization agenda
started to emerge as a credible alternative to the “there-is-no-alternative” (TINA)
politics of globalization.
In other words, there appears to exist a “breaking point” beyond which the overall
level of output legitimacy of an open and liberal democratic system is not sufficient
to compensate for the loss in input legitimacy and responsiveness, thus causing a
democratic backlash in the form of increased party-system polarization. The implicit
trade-off between political inputs and economic outputs gets reassessed, thus giving
rise to a sort of political atavism by established left- and right- wing parties reverting
to their ideological roots or the emergence of new parties on the extremes of the ide-
ological spectrum. This is due to the heightened pressure for popular representation
by an increasingly disenfranchised and disenchanted part of their core electorate and
the unwieldy nature of policy compromises necessary to maintain a country’s liberal
orientation.
This threshold point may be brought about by stochastic shocks to the aggregate
welfare benefits of integration (e.g., in the context of capital account liberalization
and financial crises), excessive constraints on the core democratic functions and
policy sovereignty of a country, or both. Countries further integrated within global
markets (mostly due to the small relative size of their domestic markets) and sys-
tems of supranational governance (often due to the political spillovers generated by
the unfettered flows of capital, people, and ideas) will be subject to narrower con-
straints on their domestic sources of input legitimacy. However, higher levels of
integration also imply higher exposure to exogenous macroeconomic shocks and
risks (Kim 2007), i.e., more noise in their political system’s overall level of output
legitimacy. Therefore, as countries integrate further both economically and politi-
cally, they become more likely to move beyond the aforementioned breaking point
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and experience heightened political volatility and democratic instability in the form
of increased party-system polarization.
The ensuing backlash towards more extreme core electoral platforms – now effec-
tively incompatible with the country’s policy constraints – will render the pro-/anti-
globalization dimension of electoral competition much more salient. Since the rise
in platform polarization may run counter to the policies imposed by the “Golden
Straitjacket” of economic globalization and political integration, then the expedi-
ency of continued membership in international organizations and the desirability of
a country’s overall liberal orientation may be called into question, thereby further
politicizing the pro-/anti- globalization axis (Kriesi 2016). Therefore, even if actual
policy outcomes and existing integration trends are not to be severely affected by the
rise in platform polarization, they still become increasingly tenuous and fragile.
As we will proceed to demonstrate empirically, we also claim that political
integration by means of rules harmonization and policy coordination generates
quantitatively and qualitatively distinct effects on national party systems vis-a`-
vis economic globalization, i.e., current and capital account openness writ large.
Whereas economic globalization generates “narrow-but-strong” informal constraints
– such as for example the Mundell-Fleming “impossible trinity” of monetary inde-
pendence, financial openness, and exchange rate stability –, political integration
produces “broad-and-strong” formal constraints on macroeconomic (monetary, fis-
cal, and trade) policy targets. There is often an explicit (hard) process of rule
enforcement and policy censoring that comes about with political integration while,
on the other hand, the constraints imposed by economic openness tend to be fuzzier
(soft). Moreover, political integration often subsumes economic integration since
supranational integration amounts to the deepening of economic relations among
regional partners that are already assumed to be “natural trading partners” (De Nardis
and Vicarelli 2003; Micco et al. 2003). Finally, with political integration one can
actually put a face on those external sources of output legitimacy, which in turn also
makes it easier for domestic actors to shift blame onto them (Schneider 2019); even
so, political trust can be rather easily rebuilt among national politicians (and their suc-
cessors). On the other hand, markets are impersonal and the loss of market confidence
can be abrupt and very durable.
3 The responsibility-responsiveness trade-off of parties
In this section, we further develop our theoretical argument with regard to the
relationship between the scope of supranational policy constraints imposed on multi-
party parliamentary democracies and their party-system polarization (extremism).8
In order to do so, we extrapolate from the party-system level onto the party level and
elaborate on the strategic trade-off faced by parties in the electoral arena between
responsibility and responsiveness.
8Although these two terms are not equivalent as discussed above, our theoretical mechanism works pri-
marily through its effect on ideological divergence; thus, platform polarization and extremism move in the
same direction.
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Each party is associated with a core ideological position in the left-right spectrum
and runs on a certain platform within a strategic game of electoral competition. On
one hand, parties care about maximizing their vote share, which may be regarded as
a rough – but fair – approximation of the probability that they enter government and,
hence, their ability to acquire office rents.9 On the other hand, parties also seek to
minimize the costs incurred by proposing a platform away from their core ideological
position. These are essentially “transportation” (communication) costs that parties
must incur in order to re-brand themselves and sell their new policy program to their
voters or otherwise to appease their more militant ideological factions,they are, thus,
strictly increasing in the distance between the proposed platform and the party’s core
ideological position.10 Based on the above, we effectively assume that party behav-
ior is driven by both office-seeking incentives of vote-maximization and electability
and ideological motives of responsiveness and rhetorical consistency with core party
positions.11
In an unconstrained policy environment non-centrist parties face the following
trade-off: moving towards more moderate (centrist) positions increases not only their
vote share and, hence, their expected office rents but also their transportation (com-
munication) costs. That is, in the absence of any other changes in the institutional
set-up (e.g., changes in the electoral rule), the degree of policy convergence towards
the center will depend on the relative size of the spoils of office (centripetal force)
and the transportation costs (centrifugal force). Thus, this trade-off will be reflected
by some limited convergence towards the center of the policy space up the point
where spatial transportation costs net of vote share gains are zero (see Fig. 1).
But what happens when additional policy constraints are imposed as a result of a
country’s participation in supranational integration schemes (in addition to its overall
level of economic openness)? Are the incentives faced by extreme parties to converge
towards the center of the policy spectrum amplified or mitigated? To answer this
question, we need to shed more light on the mechanism at play. Membership in an
international organization such as the EU can impose hard constraints on the domain
of permissible domestic policies (e.g., in the form of harmonization of taxation and
welfare spending) and effectively limit national governments’ “room to maneuver”
(Hellwig 2016). We assume that the constrained set excludes policies too much to
the left or the right of the policy spectrum. How will then extremist parties behave
if those restrictions start to bind (i.e., if the policy platforms that they would have
proposed in an unconstrained environment fall outside the permissible policy space)?
Will they further converge towards the center in order to abide by the constraints or
will they continue to advocate their core policies in the knowledge that they are not
compatible with the country’s overall level of political (and economic) integration?
9For example, according to the proportionality norm (Gamson’s Law), cabinet portfolios are distributed
among government parties in strict proportion to the number of seats that each party contributes to the
government’s legislative majority.
10In general, there is a clear analogy between these communication costs and the transportation costs that
firms pay in the standard Hotelling model.
11This formulation is analytically very similar to standard spatial models of electoral competition with
valence used in the formal literature on polarization and extremism (Aragone`s and Palfrey 2002; Aragone`s
and Xefteris 2017).

























Fig. 1 How the responsibility-responsiveness trade-off shapes non-centrist parties’ incentives to converge
or diverge. The horizontal axis depicts the left half of the traditional left-right spectrum while the verti-
cal axis depicts spatial and valence (orthogonal) costs and benefits of different ideological platforms for
a left-wing party. Its optimal unconstrained electoral platform occurs at the point where its ideological
transportation costs net of vote share gains are zero. When supranational policy constraints are relatively
slack (left bound A), the valence benefits of respecting those constraints outweigh the net spatial costs,
thus inducing the party to converge towards the left bound. On the other hand, when the supranational pol-
icy constraints are relatively tight (left bound B), the opposite is the case and the left party will revert back
to its extreme unconstrained position. The threshold point between decreasing and increasing polarization
in terms of the slackness of constraints (depth of political integration) occurs somewhere in-between and
is a function of the party system’s input and output legitimacy. Clearly, the higher the orthogonal valence
benefits are, the tighter the policy constraints need to be for the non-monotonic effect to kick in (threshold
point mores closer to the center)
In accordance with our theoretical distinction between inputs and outputs, we pur-
port that when the electoral policy space is constrained, parties effectively compete
along two dimensions: the traditional left-right ideological spectrum (representative
inputs) and a second (binary) dimension that captures whether a party runs on an
electoral platform that is compatible with the supranational union’s rules and regu-
lations (responsible outputs). We assume that while positioning along the traditional
input-related dimension of electoral competition generates spatial benefits and costs
in terms of vote share and transportation costs, posturing along the second output-
related dimension generates orthogonal valence (popularity) payoffs as a function of
the overall output legitimacy of the party system and the country’s extant level of
political (and economic) integration. When output legitimacy is high, a party that pro-
poses a responsible electoral platform that complies with the constraints imposed by
supranational bureaucrats (and markets) will be rewarded with a high positive valence
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(popularity) payoff; when output legitimacy is low, the corresponding payoffs will
also be low. By contrast, a party that chooses to ignore international commitments
(and economic orthodoxy) by proposing extreme non-permissible policy platforms
will forgo those valence payoffs. In other words, this formulation of preferences (a
simplification of a standard valence model) introduces a potential trade-off between
responsibility in terms of respecting the exigencies of political (and economic) inte-
gration – thereby enhancing the party’s electability and international credibility –
and responsiveness in terms of pandering to core voters’ and militants’ ideological
preferences – thereby exhibiting rhetorical consistency and ideological purity.
Therefore, when it comes to their electoral strategy, parties face the dilemma of
whether to propose a policy platform on the boundary of the constrained policy
space or stick with their unconstrained platform proposal; anything in-between would
effectively amount to a strictly dominated strategy. Clearly, non-centrist parties’ deci-
sion to converge or not will depend on (a) the tightness of such constraints on the
domestic sources of input legitimacy and (b) the overall level of output legitimacy of
a party system subject to a given level of supranational integration. On one hand, the
tightness of the constraints creates centrifugal incentives by raising the transporta-
tion cost of convergence while, on the other hand, higher output legitimacy creates
centripetal incentives by raising the valence (popularity) benefits of advocating a
moderate platform that is tangentially compatible with the country’s international
commitments. Therefore, any shift away from the optimized unconstrained trade-
off between vote share maximization and transportation cost minimization will only
occur if and only if the orthogonal valence benefits of advocating integration-friendly
policies (and the corresponding gain in votes) outweigh the additional ideological
transportation costs imposed by binding supranational policy constraints. Figure 1
below provides a graphical demonstration of the argument in the case of a left-wing
party.
Clearly, the larger the electoral benefit of conforming to the rules and regulations
of the international organization, the slacker the responsibility-responsiveness trade-
off, allowing conditional platform convergence to be sustained even as integration
deepens further and policy constraints become tighter. However, there is a thresh-
old value of the slackness of supranational constraints (input legitimacy) as a strictly
decreasing function of the valence benefits of pro-membership policies (output legit-
imacy) beyond which the costs of convergence to more moderate and responsible
positions can outweigh the benefits for non-centrist parties (while moderate parties
will converge towards centrist TINA policies even further).12 If, as argued earlier, we
take the valence (popularity) benefit to be stochastic, then we should expect countries
subject to narrower constraints of integration (due to small size, explicit policy con-
ditionality, or lack of political clout in the policy-formation process) and exposed to
more volatile macroeconomic shocks or business cycles to be more prone to go past
this breaking point. This result can be summarized in the following two hypotheses,
one at the party-system level and one at the party level:
12This threshold value occurs at the point where the valence benefits of running on a responsible platform
at the bounds of the permissible policy range equal the net (spatial) costs of convergence.
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Hypothesis 1 (H1) For any given orthogonal valence benefits of responsible policy
platforms that respect supranational policy constraints (output legitimacy), the rela-
tionship between a country’s depth of political integration – captured by the tightness
of supranational constraints on the electoral spectrum of domestic party competition
(input legitimacy) – and party-system polarization (extremism) is effectively non-
monotonic. For low initial levels of political integration, party-system polarization
(extremism) is expected to decrease as a result of tightening supranational policy con-
straints; however, there is a threshold point of integration deepening beyond which
tighter supranational policy constraints are not expected to induce further policy
convergence but rather to trigger a rise in party-system polarization (extremism).
Hypothesis 2 (H2) As a political system starts to integrates within a supranational
union that harmonizes common policies and limits the range of permissible policies,
non-centrist parties are initially expected to converge towards a narrower range of
electoral platforms compatible with the country’s international commitments; how-
ever, there is a threshold point in a country’s level of political integration beyond
which tighter supranational policy constraints are expected to induce non-centrist
parties to revert back to their unconstrained core positions (and possibly moderate
parties to converge even further towards responsible centrist positions).13
In sum, our results shed light on how the process of supranational integration
and the relative levels of input and output legitimacy of a domestic party system
expose parties to a substantive trade-off between responsibility in terms of abiding by
the country’s international commitments and responsiveness in terms of truly repre-
senting the ideological preferences of core voters and party activists. Relatively low
levels of supranational integration with relatively slack policy constraints (i.e., low
sovereignty costs) intensify the process of electoral platform convergence and reduce
party-system polarization (extremism) since extreme parties’ gain in valence bene-
fits (and possibly vote share) is high enough to compensate for their loss in terms of
transportation (communication) costs. Yet, as the level of integration exceeds a cer-
tain threshold value and these policy constraints become tighter (i.e., high sovereignty
costs), the situation can backfire leading to a reverse trend of platform divergence
and increasing polarization. Simply put, the corresponding loss in responsiveness
(as proxied by the increase in transportation costs) associated with further platform
convergence to the union’s acquis becomes too high relative to the valence gains
of responsible posturing so that non-centrist parties are better off proposing a pol-
icy platform that reflects their ideological roots and caters to their core electoral
constituency. This dynamic in electoral party behavior gives rise to the following
13In fact, Hypothesis H2 predicts a much sharper non-monotonic effect on party-level ideological extrem-
ism as opposed to the non-monotonic effect on party-system-level platform polarization summarized by
Hypothesis H1 since in the latter case the uneven process of ideological divergence across a certain number
of parties of distinct ideological orientation should smooth out the effect on aggregate levels of party-
system polarization. Even at the party level, however, the large distance (and hence the extreme potential
divergence) between constrained positions and the left (right) party’s optimal unconstrained position is an
artifact of the three-party assumption (see Fig. 1). The level of such divergence should arguably be smaller
in the context a party system consisting of a larger number of parties.
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non-monotonic relationship: while at first the tightening of relatively permissive
supranational constraints is expected to lower party-system polarization (extremism),
eventually ever closer integration and extremely narrow constraints are all else equal
bound to generate increasing levels of party-system polarization (extremism). This is
the key prediction of our theoretical analysis, which we set out to test in the following
section.
Although we have been focusing so far on the convergence and divergence of
electoral party platforms, we still expect government policy to remain at the pro-
integration center of gravity of the left-right spectrum – whether that be the position
of the median party, the parliamentary mean, or the expected dominant party selected
to form a government (Merrill and James 2007). Nevertheless, from the point of view
of moderate voters, market participants, and even supranational principals – and for
any degree of risk aversion –, there is a clear welfare ranking among mean-preserving
electoral outcomes with respect to other moments of the distribution such as pol-
icy variance. For any generic specification of the government and policy formation
process in parliamentary multi-party systems, platform convergence by non-centrist
parties will generally imply less policy variance, and vice versa. Therefore, plat-
form convergence and decreasing party-system polarization as a result of moderately
increasing levels of integration imply decreasing policy variance, increasing gov-
ernment stability, but also lower responsiveness to the ideological preferences of
extreme voters. However, once the non-monotonic (positive) effect of ever deeper
levels of integration and tighter supranational constraints on party-system polariza-
tion (extremism) kicks in, we would then expect higher policy variance, increasing
government instability, but also higher levels of democratic responsiveness across the
spectrum of voters.
4 Supranational integration and the polarization of European party
politics
In this section, we seek to probe our hypotheses on the non-monotonic relationship
between supranational integration – insofar as it comes with extraneous constraints
on the set of permissible domestic policies – and party-system polarization in the
context of European multi-party parliamentary democracies. No other region has
integrated politically further than Europe – albeit exhibiting at the same time sub-
stantial levels of political and economic diversity – which renders it a most suitable
and empirically rich setting for a cross-sectional and intertemporal study of the
hypothesized relationship.
The European integration process progressed by leaps and bounds on the basis
of its output legitimacy as a successful technocratic project generating growth and
stability across Europe. Especially during the early years of the Single Market and
the euro (late ’80s to early ’00s) governments seemed secure in the output legitimacy
of the multi-layered European structure as it was perceived as a bulwark of economic
stability and sustained growth. Output-driven notions of democratic accountability
and economic voting allowed moderate pro-EU parties to reap the valence benefits
of EU membership and trust in EU institutions.
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At the same time, the broadening and deepening of the supranational integration
process – through successive intergovernmental EU treaties – reshaped the contours
of domestic electoral competition by tying a number of policy areas together as part
of the deeper commitments of EU membership, shrinking the degrees of freedom
of electoral competition, and constraining the range of permissible and internally
consistent policy platforms. Such hard constraints on the traditional left-right pol-
icy spectrum stemmed from (i) formal or informal intergovernmental commitments
of EU or EMU membership (e.g., the fiscal coordination mechanisms of the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact, the European Semester, and the Fiscal Compact), (ii) enhanced
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms (e.g., the Six-Pack and Two-Pack regula-
tions), (iii) the hard process of compliance, transposition, and implementation of EU
rules and directives (e.g., the Excessive Deficit Procedure governed by Article 126 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 7 of the Treaty of the
European Union, or the European Court of Justice), and (iv) (more recently) high-
powered bailout conditionality agreements, such as theMemoranda of Understanding
between the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (collectively known as the European Troika) and
the indebted countries of the European South.
As of late, however, this technocratic process of “integration by stealth” (Majone
2005) has come under intense scrutiny as a result of stagnating labor productiv-
ity, sustained austerity, rising unemployment and debts levels, Brexit, and growing
levels of third-country immigration. These “multiple crises” have sapped the EU’s
output legitimacy without so far having triggered any significant counterbalancing
measures enhancing the Union’s so-called input legitimacy. The prevalence of “emer-
gency politics” (White 2013) and the institutional power transfers towards national
and supranational executives that took place in response to the Eurocrisis (Bauer and
Becker 2014; Rittberger 2014) have prioritized economic outputs at the expense of
political inputs. Schmidt (2013) captures this nicely by pointing towards a precarious
political imbalance: whereas output legitimacy (or “governing for the people”) has
largely come to reside at the European level – i.e., the main locus of “policy without
politics” –, input legitimization (or “governing by the people”) still takes place pri-
marily at the domestic level – i.e., the main locus of “politics without policy”. This
structural disconnect between those (supranational) institutions that determine policy
and those (national) institutions that shape politics has given rise to the EU’s so-called
“second-order democratic deficit” as deeper political and economic integration has
come to be associated with the populist backlash and the “hollowing-out” of national
democracy (Konstantinidis and Treurniet 2018).
In the empirical analysis that follows we proxy for these extraneous policy
constraints through countries’ legal status vis-a`-vis the EU (or else the degree to
which they are bound by the European acquis), controlling for the overall depth
of integration over successive EU treaties. We also expect the tightness of these
constraints (or else the degree of sovereign policy discretion) to vary with respect
to countries’ economic size (GDP), their (formal or informal) influence in the EU
policy-formation process (as captured by population size), and the output legitimacy
of overall macroeconomic conditions (e.g., GDP growth). In addition, we control
for countries’ capital account openness in order to account for the softer imperatives
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of financial liberalization and economic globalization at large. If our theory holds
water, non-centrist European political parties should have converged towards the
center (decreasing party-system polarization) during the early to middle stages of
European integration (e.g., Treaty of Rome, Single European Act) and diverged
towards the extremes (increasing party-system polarization) during its latter stages
(e.g., Maastricht Treaty, Lisbon Treaty, Fiscal Compact).
4.1 Data and empirical model at the party-system level
In order to estimate the impact of supranational integration on party-system polar-
ization (Hypothesis H1), we collected data measuring parties’ policy positions from
the most recent Manifesto Project data set (Volkens et al. 2018) for twenty-eight EU
countries between 1957 and 2015.14 This data set contains information on the left-
right positions of political parties as stated in their electoral manifestos and relies on
saliency theory by estimating parties’ position on the basis of both positive and neg-
ative emphases of issues. Ideological scores range from -100 to +100 where higher
values indicate a more right-wing orientation.
We use this data set to code the following measures of polarization as our main
dependent variable: (a) the distance between the two most extreme platforms (MDP)
(Budge andMcDonald 2006; Andrews andMoney 2009; Matakos et al. 2016) and (b)
the Dalton index (2008).15 In this regard, party-system polarization and extremism
are positively and monotonically related. Higher values of our dependent variables
denote higher levels of party-system polarization on the left-right dimension.
Our main explanatory variables are EC/EU Integration Status and EC/EU Integra-
tion Level, both coded from the Enlargement Database (ENLABASE) (Schimmelfen-
nig 2002, 2016).16 EC/EU Integration Status indicates the legal status of a country
vis-a`-vis the EU at the end of each year (based on specific events such as the signing,
ratification, and entry into force of treaties, etc.) and ranges from 0 (no special sta-
tus) to 47 if a state is integrated to the highest possible degree at a given time, where
the “highest degree” of integration changes with the evolution of the organization. In
other words, it is a fine-grained measure of “graded membership” and captures coun-
tries’ proximity to the EU’s frontier of integration (Schimmelfennig 2002, 2016).
So, for example, a core EU member-state like Germany that has always been at the
forefront of the integration process always gets the highest score of 47 in the data set.
EC/EU Integration Level is a cruder categorical variable derived from EC/EU Inte-
gration Status that classifies countries’ legal status vis-a`-vis the EU into the following
categories: “No Special Status” (0), “Collaboration” (1), “Association” (2), “Partial
14Data availability for each country starts around the time they become full-fledged parliamentary
democracies.






, where v is party j ’s vote share, x is party j ’s proposed platform, x¯ is the weighted
mean of all parties’ position, and N is the number of parties.
16For an alternative specification using a measure of Europeanization as the main independent variable
see Table A.3 in the Online Appendix.
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Membership” (3), and “Full Membership” (4). Furthermore, in light of how our inde-
pendent variables are defined, we need to control for the deepening of the European
integration process over successive EU treaties with the Depth categorical variable
also coded from the ENLABASE data set. Depth takes the following values within
given time periods: 0 from 1958 to 1978, 1 from 1979 to 1984 (establishment of the
European Monetary System), 2 from 1985 to 1991 (signing of the Schengen Agree-
ment and the Single European Act), 3 from 1992 to 1994 (signing of the Maastricht
Treaty and establishment of the European Monetary Union), 4 from 1995 to 1998
(entry into force of the Schengen regime), 5 from 1999 to 2007 (final stage of EMU
and launch of the euro), and 6 from 2008 onwards (signing of the Lisbon Treaty and
the Fiscal Stability Treaty).
The baseline empirical model that examines the (non-monotonic) impact of the
level of political integration with the EC/EU on party-system polarization has the
following functional specification:
Polarizationi,e = β0 + β1 ∗ EC/EU Integration Leveli,e
+ β2 ∗ EC/EU Integration Level 2i,e + β3 ∗ Depthi,e
+ β4 ∗ Controls + λi + γt + εi,e, (1)
where i indicates countries, e denotes elections, and t time (years or decades), i.e.,
each observation is a country-election. All specifications include country and time
fixed effects.
We also use additional control variables to account for factors that are likely to
affect party-system polarization. First, the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) is cal-
culated based on the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula.17 If a country has a high
number of effective parties, party policy platforms are expected to be more dispersed,
thereby increasing polarization. The Disproportionality of the electoral system is
coded using the Gallagher index. The inclusion of both these variables is meant to
capture the effects of changes in the electoral system on party-system polarization as
discussed in the related literature.
Second, increased global interdependence forces governments to follow certain
macroeconomic policies and is, therefore, expected to decrease polarization indepen-
dently of EU membership.18 This effect is captured by the Trade Openness variable,
which is measured as the size of a country’s exports and imports relative to its gross
domestic product (GDP) and is coded from the 8.1 Penn World Tables.
Third, to capture the idea that the impact of EU integration on party-system polar-
ization might be felt more strongly in member-states that have a lower voting weight
in the European Council and thus exert less control over the design of EU policies,
we control for the logarithm of a country’s population (Population (log) variable)
as a proxy for a country’s political clout. This variable is also coded from the 8.1
17It is as follows: 1/
∑
v2i , where vi is the percentage of the vote received by party i.
18Scholars have shown that globalization increasingly exerts pressure on governments to implement mone-
tary discipline, deregulation, privatization, and labor market flexibility in order to enhance competitiveness
and productivity (e.g., Mosley 2005).
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Penn World Tables. Fourth, as a proxy for output legitimacy and economic prosper-
ity, we also regress on GDP and GDP Growth using data coded from the 2015 World
Development Indicators.
Fifth, any polarization measure is sensitive to the distribution of voters. This is
especially true for the Dalton index since it measures deviations from the party-
system mean and weights them by party vote share. For instance, if the voter
distribution is very dense around the mean, a party’s movement towards the extremes
might have a minimal contribution to overall polarization as it will lose many votes
to centrist parties whose small deviations will now be overweighted. To account for
this effect, we include an additional control variable (Median Voter), which mea-
sures the position of the median voter using the formula of Kim and Fording (1998).
Finally, we include country (λi) and year- or decade- fixed effects (γt ). Table A.1 in
the Online Appendix includes summary descriptive statistics of the data used in the
subsequent empirical analysis.
We start our analysis by focusing on the fifteen oldest EU member-states (up
until the enlargement of 1995), namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, and the United Kingdom. Table 1 shows the results of our party-system analysis
covering a maximum of 208 cases in total.
Model 1 of Table 1 estimates the baseline model with decade fixed effects. We
find that the marginal effect of a country’s level of integration with the EC/EU on
party-system polarization is negative and significant for low levels of integration,
suggesting that the slacker constraints imposed on associate members, candidate
members, or partial members lead to ideological convergence among parties. This
could be construed as evidence of the EU’s “soft power”. As the level of EU inte-
gration increases, however, its marginal effect on polarization becomes both positive
and significant (evidence of the EU’s “second-order democratic deficit”). Model 2
also controls for GDP Growth as a proxy for the party system’s output legitimacy.
Model 3 replaces decade fixed effects with year fixed effects. Model 4 controls for
GDP Growth in addition to year fixed effects. The results change minimally across
these four specifications as they all exhibit a significant non-monotonic relationship
between the level of integration with the EC/EU and party-system polarization.
Model 5 uses the Dalton index measure of Polarization. While the sign of the
EC/EU Integration Level coefficient remains the same, it is marginally not signifi-
cant. In fact, this conforms with our prediction in Footnote 13 that the non-monotonic
increase in party-system extremism (as measured by the two-party MDP index)
should be steeper than that in party-system polarization (as measured by the multi-
party Dalton index) because with more parties the average policy shift should be
relatively milder and the Dalton index should smoothen out the non-monotonic
effect. Finally, in Model 6, we replace the EC/EU Integration Level variable with the
fine-grained EC/EU Integration Status variable. Its marginal effect on party-system
polarization is again negative for low values of integration with the EC/EU.
To get a meaningful interpretation of these results, we plot the marginal effects
on party-system polarization (extremism) at different levels of integration with the
EC/EU using the regression results from Model 4 in Table 1. In Fig. 2, the solid
line indicates how this marginal effect changes with the level of integration with
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Table 1 Effect of political integration with the EC/EU on party-system polarization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EC/EU Integration Level −13.51c −16.5b −13.26c −20.96c −0.29
(4.07) (7.36) (3.62) (7.01) (0.18)
EC/EU Integration Level (squared) 2.14b 2.73b 2.62c 4.03c 0.06
(0.9) (1.23) (0.79) (1.27) (0.04)
EC/EU Integration Status −0.861b
(0.405)
EC/EU Integration Status (squared) 0.013a
(0.007)
Depth 0.07 2.54 18.31b 17.73b −0.05 20.42c
(2.06) (2.47) (6.53) (7.16) (0.09) (6.15)
Effective Number of Parties 1.67 1.84 2.29a 1.93 0.04 2.25a
(1.66) (2.16) (1.11) (1.91) (0.06) (1.13)
Population (log) −38.5 −65.31a −60.62b −85.7a −4.23b −53.92b
(27.9) (33.51) (25.21) (45.28) (1.6) (24.51)
Trade Openness −0.26a −0.28 −0.58b −0.55 −0.01 −0.5b
(0.13) (0.17) (0.2) (0.37) (0.01) (0.23)
Trade Openness (squared) 0.00a 0.00b 0.00b 0.00a −0.00b 0.01b
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Median Voter 0.3b 0.24a 0.42c 0.41b 0.01 0.4c
(0.13) (0.11) (0.1) (0.16) (0.01) (0.1)
Disproportionality 1.08b 0.92c 0.79 0.86a 0.02 0.83
(0.47) (0.27) (0.46) (0.47) (0.02) (0.51)
GDP Growth −12.89 −18.76
(24.78) (30.21)
Constant 157.75b 226.29b 236.46c 285.04b 11.99c 218.92c
(61.13) (80.55) (59.27) (120.18) (3.63) (58.2)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Decade FE Yes Yes No No Yes No
N 208 170 208 170 208 208
The dependent variable Polarization is measured as the distance between the two most extreme parties
(MDP index) in columns (1) through (4) and in column (6), and as the Dalton index in column (5). Num-
bers in parentheses are standard errors clustered by country. a denotes statistical significance at the ten
percent level, b at the five percent level, and c at the one percent level
the EC/EU. The two-tailed ninety-five percent confidence intervals around the
line indicate the areas in which this effect is statistically significant. Accordingly,
party-system polarization (extremism) decreases up to the point where an associa-
tion agreement between a country and the EU enters into force. In corroboration
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Fig. 2 Average marginal effect of level of political integration with the EC/EU on party-system
polarization
of Hypothesis H1, once a country reaches the “Partial Membership” level, further
integration with the EC/EU increases party-system polarization.19
In Table 2, we run several robustness tests. In Model 1, we use the wider data
set, which includes data on all twenty-eight EU current member-states. The results
are almost identical to the results obtained with the smaller data set (see Model 3 in
Table 1). Model 2 restricts the analysis to the EU-15 and the pre-crisis period (up until
2009) in order to verify that this is not simply a story about the effects of the Global
Financial and Eurozone Debt Crises. The results are robust to this restricted sample.
In Model 3, we introduce the Treaty Period variable, which codes seven different
big treaty events by month-year,20 and interact it with the EC/EU Integration Level
variable to estimate how proximity to the EU’s integration frontier interacts with the
process of integration deepening to affect party-system polarization at the domestic
level. Model 4 includes separate interaction terms with each treaty dummy variable,
while Model 5 is the same as Model 3 with EC/EU Integration Status as the main
explanatory variable. Finally, in Models 6 and 7, we estimate the model with the
19Again note that the empirical non-monotonic effect on aggregate party-system polarization is rather
smooth despite the use of the two-party MDP measure of party-system extremism; this is arguably so
because the breaking point should occur at different times in different countries and, therefore, the overall
effect is averaged down.
20The seven milestone treaties of the EU are the Treaty of Rome (signed in March, 1957), the introduc-
tion of the European Monetary System (entering into force in February, 1979), the Schengen Agreement
(signed in June, 1985), the Maastricht Treaty (signed in February, 1992), the Schengen Regime (entering
into force in March, 1995), the launch of the third stage of European Monetary Union (in January, 1999),
and the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in December, 2007). As such, the Treaty Period variable builds on the
Depth variable by providing more fine-grained data on treaty dates.
316 N. Konstantinidis et al.
Table 2 Effect of the level of political integration with the EC/EU on party-system polarization: robustness
tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
EC/EU Integration Level −10.87b −12.10b −4.0b −3.94b −0.02 −0.01
(4.67) (4.11) (1.73) (1.61) (0.07) (0.06)
EC/EU Integration Level (squared) 2.22b 2.35b
(0.9) (0.84)
EC/EU Integration Status −0.39b
(0.15)
Treaty Period −6.50a −4.55 −5.73 −0.25 −0.22
(3.58) (4.22) (3.60) (0.16) (0.17)
EC/EU Integration Status*Treaty Period 0.13b
(0.06)
EC/EU Integration Level*Treaty Period 1.72b 0.062b
(0.66) (0.029)
EC/EU Integration Level*EMS 4.11b 0.09
(1.62) (0.06)
EC/EU Integration Level*Schengen 3.67b 0.09
(1.38) (0.06)
EC/EU Integration Level*Maastricht 10.05c 0.32b
(2.98) (0.12)
EC/EU Integration Level*Schengen Regime 9.29b 0.29b
(3.2) (0.13)
EC/EU Integration Level*EMU 7.94a 0.29a
(4.02) (0.16)




Trade Openness −0.47b −0.49b −0.13 −0.16 −0.12 0.00 −0.01
(0.18) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade Openness (squared) 0.00b 0.00a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00b 0.00a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 192.37c 211.73c 119.83a 171.43b 118.42 11.46c 12.71c
(66.02) (67.57) (65.95) (71.23) (67.35) (3.52) (4.19)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No No No No No
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Table 2 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 272 201 206 206 206 206 206
The dependent variable Polarization is measured as the distance between the two most extreme parties
(MDP index) in columns (1) through (5) and as the Dalton index in columns (6) and (7). All models include
theMedian Voter, Disproportionality, Effective Number of Parties, Population (log), Trade Openness, and
Trade Openness (squared) as control variables. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered by
country. a denotes statistical significance at the ten percent level, b at the five percent level, and c at the
one percent level
Polarization variable derived from the Dalton index. In Model 7, while the average
marginal effect of EC/EU Integration Level on Polarization is almost always positive,
it seems to decrease once the Schengen Agreement gets signed in June, 1985, then
increase substantially with the signing of theMaastricht Treaty in February, 1992, and
finally continue to be positive after the Maastricht Treaty but without going beyond
its 1992 level (see Fig. 3).
4.2 Data and empirical model at the party level
If our theory holds water, then we should expect the effects detected in our party-
system analysis above to carry over to the party level of electoral behavior. In
what follows, we proceed to test (party-level) Hypothesis H2 of our theory and
seek to provide further support to the robustness of our empirical results above by
thinking of party-system polarization as the result of extremism at the party level.
Fig. 3 Average marginal effect of level of political integration with the EC/EU on party-system
polarization by treaty period
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The more extreme positions parties take, the more polarized the national party system
becomes.21 In this set of tests, we expect to find that during the earlier stages of Euro-
pean integration EC/EU membership mitigated parties’ tendency towards extremism
whereas during the later stages it reinforced it. In this case, our dependent vari-
able Extremism (Mean) is operationalized as the absolute distance between a party’s
policy position and the mean party position.
We created a party-level data set by collecting data for the same fifteen EU coun-
tries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) for
the years between 1958 and 2013. Our expanded party-level data set now includes
1420 cases. In the analysis to follow, we re-scale parties’ position to range between
one and ten.22 Each observation in this model is a country-election-party.We estimate
the following equation:
Extremism (Mean)i,e,j = β0 + β1 ∗ Trendi,e,j + β2 ∗ EC/EU Membershipi,e,j
+ β3 ∗ Trend ∗ EC/EU Membershipi,e,j
+ β4 ∗ Controls + λi + γt + εi,e,j , (2)
where i indicates countries, e indicates elections, and j denotes parties, t denotes
time (years or decades), and EC/EU Membership is a binary variable.
To account for the deepening of the EU, we estimate the equation using a Trend
variable that starts in 1957 and increases by one unit in every subsequent year. We
expect EC/EU membership to impose more constraints as the European integration
deepens.23 At the same time, we expect countries to face tighter supranational con-
straints by dint of a thicker policy acquis if they join the EC/EU at a later stage.
To capture these effects, we include an interaction term (Trend*EU Membership).24
We expect the marginal impact of EC/EU membership on party-level extremism to
be negative during the earlier years of European integration and positive during the
later years when the policy constraints imposed by the EU become tighter. Summary
descriptive statistics can be found in Table A.2 in the Online Appendix.
We estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) model with country fixed effects and
robust standard errors clustered by countries. Our specification assumes that observa-
tions are not independent within clusters although they may be independent between
clusters. The first column in Table 3 shows the estimates of a model where the main
dependent variable is Extremism (Mean) and standard errors are clustered by coun-
try.25 The coefficient of the EC/EU Membership variable is negative and significant
21Note that in a multi-party system some parties may converge further towards the center while oth-
ers diverge. See Stanig (2011) for an account of the non-monotonic properties of aggregate polarization
measures in multi-party systems.
22To re-scale the index, we add 100 to each party’s position and divide the sum by 20.
23As a robustness check, we run the model replacing the Trend variable with the Treaty Period categorical
variable and dropping decade fixed effects. Our key results remain qualitatively unchanged.
24The inclusion of this interaction term mitigates any potential effects of spurious correlation (see, e.g.,
Hix 2003).
25As a robustness check, we estimate the same models with the dependent variable Extremism (Median)
operationalized as the absolute distance between a party’s position and the median party position weighted
by vote share. The results (Table A.4 in the Online Appendix) are similar to those reported here.
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Table 3 Effect of EC/EU membership (binary) on party-level extremism (mean)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EC/EU Membership −0.40b −0.39b −0.39b −0.40c −0.39b −0.39b −0.39c −0.49b
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.21)
Trend −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EC/EU Membership*Trend 0.01c 0.01b 0.01b 0.01b 0.01b 0.01b 0.01c 0.02b
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Effective Number of Parties 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Trade Openness −0.00a −0.01b −0.01b −0.00b −0.01b −0.01b −0.01c −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population (log) −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Median Voter 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.11b
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Party Vote Share −0.64c −0.60c −0.60b −0.64c −0.60c −0.60c −0.60c −1.07c
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.31)
GDP Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EMU 0.10 0.10
(0.11) (0.11)
Single Market −0.16b −0.16a
(0.07) (0.10)
Constant 2.05c 2.15c 2.29c 2.05c 2.15c 2.29c 2.15c 0.27
(0.59) (0.64) (0.66) (0.60) (0.69) (0.70) (0.70) (1.02)
N 1420 1313 1313 1420 1313 1313 1313 530
R2 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.28
The dependent variable throughout is Extremism (Mean). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clus-
tered by country in Models 1, 2, 3, and 8 and by election in Models 4, 5, and 6. Model 7 uses bootstrapped
standard errors. All models control for country fixed effects, decade fixed effects, and the Dispropor-
tionality variable, all not reported here. Model 8 only includes non-centrist parties. a denotes statistical
significance at the ten percent level, b at the five percent level, and c at the one percent level
at the five percent level while the coefficient of the Trend variable is negative but
not significant. The interaction term coefficient is both positive and significant at the
one percent level. Model 2 shows the regression results after controlling for GDP
Growth. Model 3 includes the additional controls EMU and Single Market, which are
coded as dummy variables taking the value of one only in years when EMU and the
Single Market respectively were in effect. Of these two variables, only Single Market
is found to exert a negative and significant effect on party-level extremism. Models
4-6 replicate the earlier regressions but cluster standard errors by election. Estimated
coefficients as well as their significance levels are similar to those in the previous
models. Model 7 estimates Model 2 using bootstrapped standard errors. The results
again remain unchanged.
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Fig. 4 Average marginal effect of EC/EU membership (binary) on party-level extremism from the
weighted mean party position over time
Finally, Model 8 estimates Model 1 but only for non-centrist parties, i.e., those
with an average re-scaled policy position strictly less than four or strictly greater
than six in each election-year, thus limiting the number of observations to 530. The
fact that the coefficient estimates on our key variables of interest remain qualitatively
similar implies that our results are primarily driven by the behavior of non-centrist
parties. This very much corroborates our theoretical predictions by showing that the
previously asserted non-monotonic effect of integration on aggregate levels of party-
system polarization can be mostly attributed to the initial convergence and subsequent
divergence of inherently non-centrist parties.
Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of EC/EU membership on party-level extrem-
ism at different stages of the European integration process starting from 1957 (Model
1 in Table 3).26 The two-tailed ninety-five percent confidence intervals around the
line indicate the areas in which this effect is statistically significant. As expected,
EC/EU membership exerts a negative effect on party-level extremism during the
earlier years of European integration. More specifically, the effect is negative and
statistically significant for the first eighteen years since the Treaty of Rome (1975).
As time passes, the effect becomes positive and statistically significant after the first
forty-three years from the creation of the European Communities (EC) and contin-
ues to increase with time. This also confirms our intuition that the domestic trends
of rising political extremism and polarization were already underway well before the
economic crises of the late ’00s.
26Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix shows the same marginal effect for non-centrist parties (Model 8 in
Table 3).
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Put differently, EC/EU membership induced political parties to move towards the
center until 1975 and then started pushing them towards the extremes in the early
’00s. This finding lends support to Hypothesis H2 that during the early years of
European integration non-centrist political parties moved towards the mean party
position but then started to diverge towards the extremes as European integration
deepened further.
4.3 Comparative case studies
By way of putting more flesh on the bones of our preceding regression analyses,
we now turn to discussing specific country cases and how political integration and
supranational policy constraints have affected their overall level of party-system
polarization over time. In order to estimate this dynamic effect, we employ the
“synthetic control method (SCM) for causal inference in comparative case studies”
developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie (2010, 2015). SCM makes
use of a weighted average of control units (i.e., the “artificial country”) selected from
an untreated “donor pool” of countries to construct a counterfactual scenario for the
treated country (i.e., the “actual country”). In the European context, the event (or
intervention or treatment) whose effect we are interested in amounts to a country’s
accession to the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) or the European
Monetary Union (EMU) and with it the transposition of the full acquis of rules
and regulations. SCM allows us to address the endogeneity of the binary treatment
(EC/EU/EMU accession of country i at time t) and the potential post-treatment bias
(Campos et al. 2018).
Since we only get to observe party-system polarization outcomes during election
years, we choose to operationalize our dependent variable as an annual five-year
moving average of party-system extremism as measured by the MDP index. In order
to deal with time-varying omitted variables, we match the actual and artificial coun-
tries on a yearly basis during the pre-event phase along the following set of predictors:
the Effective Number of Parties (ENP),Disproportionality, the position of theMedian
Voter, GDP per Capita, Unemployment, GDP Growth, the KOF Index of Globaliza-
tion (general), the KOF Index of Economic Globalization, the KOF Index of Political
Globalization,27 Cultural Proximity, Population, Population Density, the Status vari-
able, and Trade Openness.28 Our “donor pool” of countries draws on a sample of
(European and non-European) advanced industrialized democracies that have never
been full members of either the EU or the EMU within the given time span.29 In
our choice of matching variables and the donor pool, we attempt to satisfy two key
assumptions of SCM: (i) the set of predictors of the outcome should include variables
that can approximate the path of the treated country (“parallel trends”) but should not
27All KOF Globalization data have been drawn from Dreher (2006) and more recently from Gygli et al.
(2018).
28All new variables used here have been drawn from the International Political Economy Data Resource
(Graham and Tucker 2019).
29We do include for example EU associate countries, such as Turkey, or European Economic Area (EEA)
members, such as Norway and Iceland.
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include variables that anticipate the effects of the intervention, and (ii) the countries
used to construct the synthetic control group should not be affected by the event.30
As in Campos et al. (2018), the choice of non-European countries for our donor
sample clearly satisfies assumption (ii) as the membership treatment in one country
should not affect polarization in countries that are otherwise ineligible for full formal
membership.31 Moreover, despite the prima facie implausibility of approximating
European with non-European political systems, below we provide evidence that the
pre-treatment parallel trends assumption (i) is satisfied by the SCM’s endogenous
choice of counterfactual countries based on a given array of (economic, political, and
institutional) predictors detailed above.
In what follows, we present several comparative country cases that help illus-
trate the fact that political integration by way of formal accession to a supranational
union (viz., the EC/EU and the EMU) can have a substantial non-monotonic effect on
party-system polarization over and beyond the general trends induced by economic
globalization or other omitted factors. The endogenous selection of synthetic con-
trols is mostly driven by the degree of pre-event balance in the observables and the
chosen time span is a function of the availability of appropriate donor countries.32
Figure 5 presents six comparative cases including at least one country from the
1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, and 2004 waves of EC/EU enlargement.33 The EC/EUmem-
bership treatment effect is captured by the discrepancy between the post-treatment
polarization trends of the treated country (solid lines) and those of its synthetic con-
trols (dashed lines) as it differences out any other common party-system polarization
trends due to other factors. A widening negative difference or a narrowing positive
difference between these trend lines is interpreted as a negative effect of supra-
national integration on party-system polarization; on the other hand, a narrowing
negative difference or a widening positive difference is interpreted as a positive effect
of supranational integration on party-system polarization.
In most cases, we observe a strong non-monotonic (U-shaped) pattern, which is
consistent with our theoretical and empirical results: compared to the artificial coun-
try (consisting of a weighted average of non-EC/EU members at the time), initial
30Although we are quite confident that both these assumptions are generally satisfied by our identification
strategy, we should point out two key caveats: (i) European integration is a “moving target” and amounts
to multiple interventions over time in the form of successive treaties of integration deepening within sev-
eral policy areas, and (ii) treatment effects may very well be felt during the pre-event stage of accession
negotiations, where candidate-members are expected to satisfy a given set of accession criteria while they
remain in the union’s ante-chamber. The latter effect was especially more pronounced in the latest waves
of EU enlargement (2004, 2007, 2013), where the acquis was thicker and accession countries had to make
up a lot more ground.
31That being said, non-European countries are potentially subject to a softer (graded membership)
treatment effect in the form of trade and association agreements.
32Admittedly, we are not able to achieve perfect pre-treatment matching in many cases for two reasons:
(1) most of our cases consist of countries that either joined the EC/EU early on (e.g., the UK) or had just
recently become multi-party parliamentary democratic systems before joining the EC/EU (e.g., Greece),
thus leaving little time within our time series to fully satisfy the parallel trends assumption, and (2) our
donor pool of non-EC/EU/EMU countries is relatively limited due to data restrictions.
33We are not able to present results for the newest EU members – namely, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia
– as the post-event amount of observations in our data set is very limited.
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(a) 1973 EC enlargement (UK) (b) 1981 EC enlargement (Greece)
(c) 1986 EC enlargement (Spain) (d) 1986 EC enlargement (Portugal)
(e) 1995 EU enlargement (Austria) (f) 2004 EU enlargement (Poland)
Fig. 5 Comparative SCM case studies of the effect of EC/EU accession on party-system polariza-
tion/extremism (as captured by the MDP index). Note: The full set of donor countries for the EC/EU SCM
analysis is the following: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Israel, Japan,
Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US.
Artificial (synthetic) UK consists of New Zealand (41.5%), Turkey (51.2%), and the US (7.2%); artificial
(synthetic) Greece consists of Australia (4%), Canada (6%), Iceland (20.7%), Israel (5.1%), Japan (3.1%),
Mexico (48.8%), Switzerland (15.5%), and Turkey (2.1%); artificial (synthetic) Spain consists of Aus-
tralia (4.5%), Canada (13.6%), Iceland (13.8%), Japan (36.5%), Mexico (2.5%), Turkey (6.5%), and the
US (20.5%); artificial (synthetic) Portugal consists of Iceland (33.6%), New Zealand (4.7%), Switzerland
(26.7%), Turkey (14.6%), and the US (20.4%); artificial (synthetic) Austria consists of Australia (14.1%),
Canada (32.2%), and New Zealand (53.7%); artificial (synthetic) Poland consists of Canada (3.9%), Japan
(37.7%), Romania (4.2%), Russia (19.9%), and Turkey (32%)
324 N. Konstantinidis et al.
entry is associated with a decline in party-system polarization (or extremism as best
captured by the MDP measure) – where, in fact, this process may have started earlier
during the pre-accession phase – followed by a subsequent rise.34 By way of prob-
ing our hypothesized relationship between the input-output legitimacy trade-off and
political polarization, we also present a three-year moving average of annual GDP
growth rates (as a proxy for output legitimacy) for each country in our sample in
Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix.
To some extent, each country’s party system follows its own idiosyncratic trajec-
tory as conditioned by its particular electoral system and the relationship between
its overall macroeconomic environment (output legitimacy) and its decision to join
or not to join subsequent supranational integration treaties. The UK, for example,
the largest of the first countries to join the EC in 1973, exhibits a double-dipped
pattern, where two inflexion points of increasing polarization seems to occur in the
run-up to the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 and the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992 with a brief interlude of convergence in the aftermath of the Single Euro-
pean Act (SEA) of 1986. Note that both inflexion points fall within a prolonged
recessionary period (see Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix). Following the early
consensus around membership generated by the 1975 Referendum on the European
Communities, the Labor and Conservative Parties started to exhibit increasing ide-
ological divergence under the leadership of Michael Foot and Margaret Thatcher
respectively in the early ’80s followed by a brief period of convergence. The Maas-
tricht Treaty negotiations coupled with the EMS Crisis of 1992 eventually brought to
light widening intra-party rifts over Europe causing another anti-EU backlash.
Our findings have been nowhere more so evident than in Greece, a country that
has exhibited a similar double-dipped polarization pattern centered around the major
treaties of European integration. While the early optimism of EC accession (in 1981)
– that came with a substantial injection of funds –, the ratification of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, and the periods of adjustment and reform that ensued respectively led
to significant ideological convergence between the main center-left (PASOK) and
center-right (Nea Dimokratia) parties towards pro-EU policies, periods of economic
recession (see Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix) under the tightening constraints
of EC/EU membership (in the aftermath of the SEA in 1986 and the Lisbon Treaty
in 2007) triggered prolonged episodes of party-system polarization (extremism). In
other words, Greece had a sort of “love affair” with the EU during the pre-Olympic-
games spending spree of 1996-2004, which bought plenty of output legitimacy and
material compensation; since the beginning of the Greek Debt Crisis (2009-18), how-
ever, it has experienced severe political volatility and painful fiscal consolidation
whilst teetering on the brink of bankruptcy and Eurozone exit.
Spain and Portugal, on the other hand, the next two countries to join the EC in
1986, exhibit smoother U-shaped post-accession patterns of polarization compared
34Some of the inconsistencies in the patterns may be due to three reasons: (i) as we have argued before, the
binary nature of EC/EU membership does not capture the complexity of the deepening process of political
integration as existing treaties get updated and other treaties come into force, (ii) the time span of our panel
data set varies from one country-case to another both in terms of pre-event and post-event data availability,
and (iii) the donor pool of permissible counterfactuals is in some cases rather limited (e.g., Austria).
“Take back control”? The effects of supranational integration... 325
to synthetic control trends. While both experienced periods of political turbulence
and ideological divergence during the early years after the collapse of their dictato-
rial regimes, in both cases EC accession seemed to make a substantial contribution to
the process of democratic consolidation in the form of ideological convergence and
de-escalation of aggregate levels of party-system polarization. Yet, while the inflex-
ion points of increasing polarization both seem to occur during recessionary periods
(see Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix), they happen at different moments in the
process of European integration (around the time of the Lisbon Treaty and the Global
Financial Crisis for Spain,35 and the Maastricht Treaty and the EMS crisis of 1992
for Portugal).
Austria, one of the 1995 EU enlargement countries, also exhibits the same U-
shaped pattern. Austria is an interesting case of a net contributor country, developed
enough at the time of accession that it did not have to go through an extended pre-
accession period of adjustment and transposition of the European acquis; yet, it also
experienced an early period of convergence during a very productive period in the
process of European integration in the late ’90s (e.g., Amsterdam Treaty of 1997,
launch of the euro). In Austria’s case, the inflexion point of the populist backlash
occurs around the time of the Nice Treaty (2003) and has arguably much to do with
the growing influx of immigrants (but also with an economic slowdown as shown
in Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix). Finally, it might probably be Poland, one
of the newest EU member-states, that exhibits the clearest U-shaped polarization
pattern, with the early years of economic adjustment and ideological convergence
immediately followed by a strong backlash of increasing polarization in the aftermath
of the Lisbon Treaty and the Global Financial Crisis (and a certain deceleration of
GDP growth).36
In the remainder of this section, we study the impact of EMU membership on
domestic party systems as we expect distinctive effects generated by an ever deeper
form of supranational integration and policy coordination. The EMU effectively
amounts to a subunion of the EU as it consists of EU member-states that chose to
adopt a common currency, thereby relinquishing control over their monetary policy
and further coordinating their fiscal policies. Figure 6 below presents five compara-
tive cases of the effects of EMUmembership on aggregate party-system polarization:
four are among those countries of the Southern periphery substantially impacted by
the recent crisis and subjected to harsh bailout agreements (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Spain), while one belongs to the EMU subgroup of Northern creditor countries (Aus-
tria). The related annual GDP growth rate time series are presented in Figure A.3 in
the Online Appendix. In all five cases, where matching of pre-event trends against
those of artificial countries seems to work well, we once again detect a U-shaped
effect of EMU accession on party-system extremism (as captured by the MDP mea-
sure). To a large extent, the non-monotonic effect reflects the Eurozone Debt Crisis
35It should be noted, however, that the left-right polarization measure does not necessarily capture Spain’s
worsening center-periphery relations and the ideological divergence between Spanish parties on the pro-
/anti- centralization axis; this trend presumably started much earlier.
36Results from other Visegrad countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, exhibit equally clear
and well-balanced trends and are available from the authors upon request.
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(a) Austria (b) Greece
(c) Ireland (d) Italy
(e) Spain
Fig. 6 Comparative SCM case studies of the effect of EMU membership on party-system polariza-
tion/extremism (as captured by the MDP index). Note: The full set of donor countries for the EMU SCM
analysis is the following: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US. Artificial (synthetic) Austria
consists of Australia (32.8%), Canada (11.3%), New Zealand (50.2%), and the UK (6%); artificial (syn-
thetic) Greece consists of Australia (36.2%), Israel (15.2%), Japan (6%), Mexico (36.5%), and the UK
(6%); artificial (synthetic) Ireland consists of Australia (71%), Denmark (21%), and New Zealand (8%);
artificial (synthetic); artificial (synthetic) Italy consists of Canada (33.1%), Switzerland (46.5%), and
Turkey (20.4%); artificial (synthetic) Spain consists of Australia (8.4%), Canada (18.2%), Japan (17.7%),
Mexico (15.3%), New Zealand (6.8%), the UK (6.4%), and the US (27.2%)
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political backlash both in terms of increased conditionality for debtor countries and
bailout disbursements for creditor countries.
While the preventive arm of the Maastricht Treaty’s Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) forced countries to make macroeconomic adjustments in order to meet the
Maastricht convergence criteria before acceding to the final stage of EMU, it was
only until the corrective arm came into effect – in the form of the Excessive Deficit
Procedure – that EMU’s policy constraints started to have more bite and suppress
party-system polarization. Once the preventive and corrective arms of the SGP
proved to be inadequate, policymakers decided that the EMU’s monitoring, preven-
tion, and correction capabilities had to be complemented by policy innovations in
the field of fiscal and macroeconomic governance consisting of new treaties (e.g.,
the Treaty on Stability, Cooperation, and Governance and its Fiscal Compact), fiscal
coordination schemes (e.g., the European Semester), ad hoc mechanisms (e.g., the
European Financial Stability Mechanism and the European Stability Mechanism),
and revised sets of regulations (e.g., the Six Pack and Two Pack) (Closa 2015).
In most of our cases, the non-monotonic inflexion point of increasing polarization
occurs around the time of the turbulent crisis years of the late ’00s and slightly before
some of the indebted countries of the European South had to accede to high-powered
conditionality agreements in the form of Memoranda of Understanding between the
European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).37 Clearly, the Eurozone Debt Crisis triggered rising levels of
polarization both within and across countries.
5 Concluding remarks
Throughout the post-WWII era and all the way into the early 2000s the inherent
tensions between globalization and national democracy (Rodrik 2012) appeared to
be bottled up within a broader liberal democratic consensus with regard to the effi-
ciency merits of economic interdependence, political integration, and technological
advancement. In recent times, however, many advanced liberal democratic systems
seem to have experienced a breaking point beyond which many of these trade-offs
have become politicized, thereby juxtaposing the previously unchecked forces of
globalization and integration against the counter-forces of nativism and illiberalism
and polarizing public discourse around stark political dilemmas between populism
and pragmatism, democracy and technocracy (Habermas 2015; Caramani 2017).
Such tensions manifest themselves in the widening spatio-temporal gap between
capital markets and democratic politics, the growing disparities between sources of
input and output legitimacy, and the tightening trade-off between responsibility and
responsiveness.
In this paper we postulated that one of the principal manifestations of this degen-
erative process is party-system polarization in the electoral arena. We theorized
the relationship between integration and polarization both at the party-system level
37In the case of Austria, however, this breaking point seems to occur sooner due to idiosyncratic reasons
such as the cumulative impact of early waves of immigration.
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with the trade-off between political inputs (representation) and economic outputs
(compensation) and at the party level of electoral competition with the responsibility-
responsiveness trade-off between net spatial transportation (ideological) costs and
orthogonal valence benefits. We showed that while rapid integration in the form of
tightening policy constraints may initially speed up ideological convergence across
the spectrum, there is a threshold level in the slackness of supranational constraints
beyond which they can have the opposite effect and backfire in terms of extreme plat-
form polarization. This non-monotonic relationship was borne out by our empirical
analysis of party-system polarization and party-level extremism in European parlia-
mentary multi-party systems. We found a negative and statistically significant effect
of integration on party-system polarization and party extremism during the earlier
phases of the European project, when the integration process centered around areas
of “low politics” (e.g., energy, trade, common market regulation). However, we also
found strong evidence of a reversal of that process of ideological convergence during
those later stages of European integration marked by the broadening and deepening
of the EU’s scope of policy competences.
Our empirical results also seemed to suggest that this “paradigm shift” had been
underway well before the deeply recessionary effects of the Global Financial and
Eurozone Debt Crises were felt. As a result of the persistence of austerity policies,
rising debt burdens, stagnating labor incomes, bank bailouts, and the augmenting
incidence of taxation on unskilled labor among other factors, issues such as income
inequality, social justice, national identity, and the design of economic, financial, and
political globalization have long been part and parcel of the core political agenda of
democratic politics. Moreover, the surge in migration flows has for some time now
rekindled the rise of nativism and identity politics against the multiculturalism of
most advanced liberal democracies (Rodrik 2017).
Our work helps better understand the potential repercussions of unfettered crisis-
ridden globalization coupled with political volatility and polarization. As long as
the locus of democratic inputs remains at the national level, then basic questions of
job (in)security, social protection, income inequality, and national identity will keep
roaring back to the forefront of politics in advanced liberal democracies. We should,
therefore, no longer be surprised by the political success of populist candidates advo-
cating trade protectionism, immigration restrictions, and retrenchment from global
policy coordination agreements on issues such as financial regulation, tax policy,
defense, and climate change. Moreover, we should expect national elections to func-
tion less effectively as a way of translating citizens’ preferences into government
policy as a result of the growing incongruence between input-oriented representative
and output-oriented responsible government.
While other papers in this Special Issue study the implications of the rise of pop-
ulism for the stability of the liberal international order, we reverse the question and
show how the design and overall effectiveness of institutions of global governance
and supranational integration create “second-image-reversed” effects upon domes-
tic democratic politics (Gourevitch 1978). Although we do not explicitly derive the
conditions for withdrawal from a supranational organization with high sovereignty
costs, we argue that increased party-system polarization in the form of ideologi-
cal extremism, nativist populism, and nationalist anti-globalism (especially in key
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member-states) may irrevocably sap the political consensus underpinning the liberal
international order.
Hence, our findings have wide-ranging normative implications about the political
feasibility of the policy centralization process and the sequencing of economic and
political integration especially in the European context. The EU’s “multiple crises”
(namely, the euro crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, and the populist backlash) have
highlighted the complex nature of economic interdependence and cross-border policy
spillovers. On one hand, the emergency politics of crisis management, predomi-
nantly driven by considerations of output legitimacy and policy coordination, have
led to a power shift towards unelected and unaccountable executive bodies both at the
national and European levels. On the other hand, there is a backlash of growing pop-
ular demand for input legitimization in the form of national “beggar-thy-neighbor”
solutions, often voiced (and in some cases put into effect) by populist and nationalist
politicians.38
Europe, therefore, finds itself at a crossroads whereby any further pursuit of
efficiency-oriented policy centralization will have to be cushioned by institutional
structures of democratic responsiveness and representation. However, this conun-
drum cannot be overcome as long as these mechanisms of input legitimization reside
at the level of the nation-state. As Habermas (2015) argues, the only way to break
free of the current input-output trade-off seems to be by reinstating democracy at
the European level and infusing supranational institutions with direct mechanisms of
democratic legitimization.
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